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Crises: Principles and Policies 
With an Application to the Euro Zone Crisis1 
Joseph E, Stiglitz 
Economies around the world have faced repeated crises- more frequently over 
the past thirty years. 2 The fact that they have become more frequent and per-
vasive at the same time that we believe we have learned more about the man-
agement of the economy and as rnarkets have seemingly iinproved poses a 
puzzle: shouldn't rational niarkets avoid these catastrophes, the costs of which 
outweigh, by an enormous an1ount, any benefit that might have accrued to 
the economy from the actions prior to the crisis that might have contributed 
to it? This is especially true of the large fraction of crises that can be called 
"debt crises," precipitated by a country's difficulty in repaying what it owes. 
The benefits of incoine smoothing (arising fro1n the difference in the marginal 
utility of income in periods when income is low and when income is high) are 
overwhelmed by the social and econo1nic costs of the ensuing crisis. 
For economic theory, crises pose another puzzle: typically the state vari· 
ables that describe an economy change slowly. But what distinguishes a crisis 
is that the state of the economy seems to change dramatically, in a relatively 
short time. This should be even 1nore puzzling to those who believe in some 
version of rational expectations, for shouldn't markets have anticipated the 
untoward change of events? And if they had done so, wouldn't the problems 
have appeared earlier? There is seldom any single item of "news" that leads to 
the kind of radical revision of expectations that often seem to be associated 
witl1 crises. 3 
For those who believe in well-functioning markets, there is yet another 
puzzle. The assets - the human, physical, and natural capital - of a country 
are essentially the same after the crisis as they were before. A misallocation of 
capital before the crisis- say as a result of a housing bubble - should imply that 
incomes after the crisis would be lower than would otherwise be the case. But 
there is nothing in standard theory to suggest that there should be a high level 
of unemployment, or a dramatically lower level of output. Indeed, properly 
measured, GDP might even increase. 'fhis is true even if there is a legacy of 
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debt. Debt should affect the claims on society's resources, that is, how the 
national pie is divided; but that's all.4 
Keynesian economics provides soine insights into these puzzles - certainly 
more than neoclassical 1nodels tl1at assume that the economy is always at 
full employ1nent. But standard Keynesian econo1nics had little to say about 
dyna1nics: it was an equilibrium theory, attempting to explain the per~ 
sistence of UiletnployrnenL It made no atte1npt to explain why the breaking 
of a bubble should _have such adverse effects. Although ruodern variants of 
New Keynesian econo1nics (originating with the work of Fisher5 that was 
conternporaneous with Keynes, and updated in the work of Greer1wald and 
Stiglitz f1988a, 1988b-, 1990, 1993a, 1993b) help explain why shocks to the 
economy that have significant effects on balance sheets would have per-
sistent and long-lasting effects,6 they don't really explain crises - why there 
should be events with large balance sheet effects - at least within a theory 
disciplir1ed by some variant of rational expectations. (Of course, if we are 
willing simply to posit large changes in expectatio11s and/or a change in 
asset prices unrelated to any change in underlying fundamentals, then it is 
easy to generate crises, especially of a kind associated with large changes in 
bala11ce sheets.) 
The euro crisis, and the Great Recession which led to it, provide dramatic 
instances of these puzzles. And a study of the unfolding euro crisis provides 
hints as to the plausibility of alternative explanations, and the strengths and 
deficiencies of different theories. 
After providir1g a general theory of crises, in which rnultiple equilibrium 
and discontinuities in expectations play a critical role, we will then focus on 
the role of adjustments and the reasons that requisite adjustments sometimes 
don't occur. 
1.1.1 A theoretical taxonomy of crises 
Not all economic downturns are crises, but economic crises almost always 
become severe downturns, of varying durations. Broadly speaking, we can 
identify three categories of economic fluctuations: 
(a) Short-terrn fluctuations, brought on by, for instance, excess inventory 
accurnulations or central banks stepping on the brakes too hard in ar1 over-
zealous fight against inflation. (Occasionally, short-term fluctuations can 
be brought on by a supply shock, such as a drought.) 
(b) Son1ewhat deeper and longer-lasting downturns, the bala11ce sheet reces~ 
sions described earlier, often associated with the breaking of a bubble or the 
sudden realization that an important price (or set of prices) in the economy 
(such as the exchange rate) 11as been set "incorrectly," with consequences 
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of a persistent (and evidently unsustainable) departure from "equilibriu1n." 
Prior to the 2008 crisis, n1any economists had, for instance, argued that 
out-of-equilibriun1 exchange rates (sustail1ed in part by governrnent inter-
ventions) had led to global imbalances, and that a disorderly unwinding 
of these global imbalances would result in a crisis.7 As it turned out, it was 
the bursting of the housing bubble in ll1e United States, rather t11an the 
global unwinding of global imbalances, that led to the crisis.8 1'hose crises 
associated with credit excesses (leading to bubbles) have become dubbed 
~insky cycles. But while MiI1sky (see, for example, l 982) and Kindleberger 
(1978) have identified repeated patterns of credit excesses - often fueled by 
collateral-based lending, wl1ere, as real estate prices increases, the value of 
collateral on which lending is based also increases - it is hard to reconcile 
sucl1 excesses with rational expectations.9 
(c) Deep structural crises, such as the Great Depression, which seen1 to last 
far longer tl1an can be accounted for by the slow process of repairing 
balance sheets. These arise out of tl1e difficulties that market economies 
have in making large structural changes, whicl1 typically require sig-
nificant investments in restoring the strength of those whose human 
and other capita! has been eviscerated by the economic change; because 
of in1perfections in capital Inarkets (explicable in terms of informatior1 
asymrnetries) those who need to n1ake these investments are constraiI1ed 
frorn doing so, and thus labor, which needs to be reallocated to reflect the 
structural change, is impeded from doing so. The breakdown of financial 
institutions in the midst of these long-tern1 downturns only serves to 
prolong thern. 
Identifying the nature of the crisis (or downturn) is not always easy, partially 
because a crisis of one type may morph into one of anotl1er type, partly 
because any Jong-lived crisis will have real balance slteet effects and will be 
associated with problems in the financial sector - even when the financial 
sector was not the original cause of the crisis. io There are strong reasons to 
believe that tl1e downturn that began in 2008, the Great and Long Recession, 
is structural in r1ature. The fact that output fell in many countries iI1 which 
there was no financial crisis (for instance, in manufacturi11g econo1nies such 
as China) shows that it affected more thar1 just the fiI1ance sector. 'fhe con-
tinuing weakness in the economy in the US, in tl1e aftermath of the 2008 
crisis, where bank and corporate balance sheets have been largely restored 
(at least to tl1e point that invest1nent outside of real estate l1as returned 
to near-nor1nal levels11 ) suggests too that it is more than a balance sheet 
recession.12,13 
This paper focuses on the latter two - and especially the third - kind of 
downturns, which are often deep and long lasting. 
1.1.1.1 A general theoretical framework 
A crisis is a sudden change in the (perceived) state of the economy, one which is 
often associated with the collapse of a currency, the banking system, or the real 
economy. It is a sudden change in the perforn1ance of the economy. Standard 
models of the econo1ny model the flow variables (consumption, investment, 
etc.) x as a function of a set of variables that describe the state of the econoiny, 
S, and a set of decision variables, d, which themselves are typically a function 
of an expanded set of state variables, which include expectations of the future. 
For simplicity, we \vrite d = d(S), so that the flow variables can be expressed 
sirnply as a function of the state of the econo1ny. The state variables change 
according to a law of rnotion, 
dS/dt = ~ (x(S), d(S), S) = ,. (S) 
Because S changes slows, x and d change slowly. There should be no crises. 
Occasionally, there are what niay be viewed as exogenous changes that can 
lead to a sudden large change in the relevant variables. The above for1nulation 
should be generalized to include uncertainty; there can be an "outlier" real-
ization of a random variable (a drought), and, particularly in the presence of 
non-linearities, this can have a large itnpact on the state and behavior of the 
econorny. 
But most crises are not related to the realization of a 3-standard deviation 
shock in an exogenous randon1 variable. The 2008 crisis was related to the real 
estate crash, the 2001 recession to the bursting of the tech bubble. Both were 
endogenous disturbances. There were no large exogenous events that could have 
accounted for these crises. 
Looking over past crises, there are four possible models that can describe the 
observed dynamics. 
A. Multiple momentary equilibrium. Many econornic models are character-
ized by multiple momentary equilibria. That is, a given set of state variables 
1naps not into a single set of flow variables, but into a n1ultiplicity of pos-
sible equilibria. We may not (and typically do not) have a coinplete theory 
of determination of equilibriurn; how one or the other menibers of the 
set happens to occur. For instance, if the "market" believes that a firm (an 
economy) is not likely to go bankrupt, interest rates will be low, and at the 
low interest rate, the probability of bankruptcy will be low. But if the market 
believes that the probability of bankruptcy is high, then there will be a high 
interest rate, and a correspondingly high probability of bankruptcy. Both 
of these can be rational expectations equilibria (see Greenwald and Stiglitz, 
2003).14 The defining characteristic of such models is "positive feedbacks." 
With multiple mon1entary equilibria, the economy can move suddenly from 
one configuration into another -with the latter, for instance, having disas-
trous consequences for the economy or so1ne group within the economy. To 
take up the example just given: if, suddenly, the n1arket believes that there 
is a high probability of bankruptcy and interest rates (rationally) adjust to 
reflect this, then not only will the behavior of the economy cl1ange sud-
denly, but so will its evolution. In short, tl1ere ca11 be discontinuous char1ges 
in x even if S (now understood to include only t!1e "real" physical variables, 
like capital stock) changes slowly, and these discontinuous changes in x can 
lead to discontinuities in the pattern of changes in S. (Smay still be a con-
tinuous variable, but S(t) is not differentiable). 
B. Expectations as State Variables. While physical objects (like the capital 
stock) typically change continuously, this need not be the case for beliefs. 
And this includes beliefs about the future value of state variables. Since 
dS/dt is not continuous when the economy changes from one momentary 
equilibriurn to another, it is clearly conceivable that individuals (even 
rationally) could suddenly change their beliefs about tl1e future course of 
the e(_-onomy. For instance, if there are multiple 1no1nentary equilibria corre-
sponding to every S(t), then as the economy "chooses" one or the other, 
the future course of the economy changes dramatically. This uncertainty 
can be rationally incorporated into beliefs ex ante.15 Changes in the future 
course of the econon1y get reflected, of course, in the values of assets, so that 
though the physical assets the1nselves change in a way whicl1 is continuous, 
the valuations tl1ernselves niay change in ways which are discontinuous, 
leading to - and reinforcing- discontinuities in behavior. 
The fact that in these and related models of dyr1a1nics expectations can 
play such a central role is consistent with the fina11cial sector's ernphasis 
on the role of confidence. If the market has confidence (for example, that 
there is only a low probability of default), ther1 interest rates will be low, as 
we have noted, and the probability of a default will be low. But such asser-
tions do little to help explain (or affect) expectations, tl1ough sometimes 
they can be thought of as helping to construct sur1spot equilibria, 16 where 
certain government actions (like raising interest rates) serve as a coord· 
inating rnecl1anism on expectations (for exan1ple, that inflation will be 
low). 
C. Multiple long-run equilibrium, Even if there is a unique momentary equi-
librium, there can be rnultiple steady states, and the steady state to which 
the economy converges can (and will typicaUy) depend on the initial condi-
tions, S0 • Slight changes in these can lead to the convergence to a different 
equilibrium. Again, while S is continuous, dS/dt is not, and there can be 
sudden changes in the prospects of the economy as a result of a shock that 
moves the economy across a boundary. Debt can, for instance, go from 
being "sustainable" to being "unsustainable." 
Behaviors are likely to change discontinuously across these boundaries, 
so that x(S) is not itself continuous. 
D. History matters: threshold effects and adjustment rigidities. The ana-
lysis so far bas followed the standard macroeconornic tradition of treating 
the economy as described by a set of variables that described tl1e physical 
state of the economy, say the amount of real and human capital. But in 
more general models, there is a richer set of state variables, including, for 
instance, the wealth (asset holdings) of each individual and each of their 
beliefs. Moreover, history rnatters. Their beliefs and actions are affected by 
the past in a way that is not adequately summarized by say current asset 
holdings. Formally, we can expand the set of state variables to include the 
values of asset holdings in prior periods, so that, say x1 ""' ftJ (Sv Si·t' St.z, ..... ). 
History-dependent models include those in wl1ict1 individuals do not adjust 
behavior for s1nall changes in S, for exan1ple1 because of adjust1nent costs. 
Only when there are large disparities between the value of x that would 
be chosen if there were no adjustment costs and the current value is large 
enough does x change. The implication is that there can be discontinuities 
in x even if, between this period and the last, there is a sma!l change in S. 
The large change in x can, of course, have large consequences for the future 
evolution of the economy: there can be a "crisis." 
In this theory, then, crises are caused, in part, by rigidities in adjustment. 
If adjustmer1t costs were lower, adjustments would be 1nade s1noothly, and 
the large discontir1uities associated with crises wou!d not occur. This was 
one of the arguments used for moving from fixed to flexible exchange 
rate systeu1s: fixed exchange rate systerns result in cumulative disparities 
between the official exchange rate and the "shadow" exchange rate, what 
the exchange rate would have been in a free market; adjustment must 
eve11tually occur, but the large adjustment that then occurs has far greater 
consequences than those that would have emerged from a series of smaller 
adjustments. (Interestingly, moving to a flexible exchange rate system has 
not elin1inated currency crises; if anythirtg, they have becorne even more 
frequent. 1'he destabilizing effects of untethered expectations, generating 
volatile short-term capital flows, often seems to overwhelm the adverse 
effects of discrete adjust1nent). 
Sirnilar discorttinuities in behavior arise when niarkets or government 
suddenly realize that sorne constraint (the ability to borrow, the ability to 
repay, the ability to support the currency, the ability to continue to grow 
witl1out hitting some resource limitation) will be binding, unless some large 
cl1ange in behavior occurs. 
The discussion above focuses on large discontinuities in behavior that 
can arise even in the presence of the continuous movement in (physical) 
state variables, and even in the presence of rational expectations. 17 But there is 
overwhelming evidence that expectations are often not rational; it is hard 
to reconcile, for instance, behavior in the run up to the Great Recession 
with rational expectations. To be sure, as one would have expected, some 
market participants (such as investn1ent bankers and hedge fund speculators) 
profitably exploited sorne of the irrationalities evidenced by other market 
participants, but hardly to the point of "correcting" the market.18 Still, 
large numbers of individuals bought houses on the irrational belief that the 
housing bubble would continue, investors bought mortgages on the irrational 
belief that borrowers would and could repay the mortgages - in part because 
they too believed tl1at the bubble would continue; and regulators lowered 
lending standards, even as the bubble's momentum gained force, again in the 
irrational belief that there was no bubble (because efficient markets would 
not tolerate a bubble) and/or that one could not tell that there was a bubble 
until after it had broken broke (all policy is made under uncertainty, and, as 
housing prices soared, surely a rational regulator would have realized that 
there was a higher probability that there was a bubble).19 Later in this essay! 
will provide further evidence that one cannot plansibly reconcile pre-crisis 
behaviour with rational expectations. 
Once one admits the possibility of "irrational" expectations, then, of 
course, it is easy to generate crises, as market participants, acting in a herd-llke 
manner, suddenly change their assessments of the future. Often, these reas-
sessments are linked with the limited foresight of market participants - they 
can see perhaps one or two or at most three years down the road, but have a 
hard time tracing out longer-term dynamics. Thus, the Greek debt had been 
accumulating gradually. It did not go from suddenly becoining sustainable to 
being unsustainable. The revelation that it was slightly greater than had previ-
ously been thought rnay have helped precipitate the crisis, but the hidden debt 
was small, and was undertaken by a previous government, and so said nothing 
about the likely inisbehavior of the government then in power.20 
There are many other instances in which market participants suddenly 
realize that a posited path is not dynamically consistent, when it should have 
been obvious at an earlier stage that that was at least likely the case. !n the 
US housing bubble, prices were rising far faster than incomes, so that the 
share of income that would have to be spent on housing would ahnost cer-
tainly increase, and would have to continue to increase if the bubble was to 
be sustained. But the demand for housing was sustained because of the high 
expected capital gains. Once it becarne clear that housing prices couldn't con-
tinue to grow atthe high rate that they had in the past, the demand for housing 
would fall, and housing prices risked coining down. The moment that this was 
commonly recognized, the bubble would break. Even acknowledging this fact 
says nothing about when the bubble would break. If large numbers believed 
that they were smarter than others, then they could believe that they could 
stay in the rnarket until just before the bubble broke, earning excess returns in 
'?"""'- ~-- - -'"°' - -~~,.,,_, , -~r. . e.ff·e~·,,~(on~nve•tment). •e,·nfo••e the'e •on'eq••en•e' UnempI1o"yepmheEnt5"n15'.','e'a· 5e: 
the interirn. It was, of course, irrational for most rnarket participants to believe , ,__ _, , _, , ,,.,, _, ,__ _, ,__ ,,_ • ,__ _, _, 
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that they were srnarter than "average." _--! still further. Thus, the decentralized market response to the deficiency in 
Many of the circurnstances in which bubbles have burst, or in which a _-;I aggregate demand is to increase it further. 
seeming persistent "disequilibrium" has finally unraveled, are associated "--\ Interestingly, making markets more flexible may exacerbate the disequii-
with large rnarket participants suddenly realizing that a constraint to which ----j brating dynarnics. If wages fall faster, tl1en the distribution of income changes 
they had paid insufficient attention is about to bind in the not too distant --;1 more adveisely against workers, and aggregate demand falls further. Thus 
future - for i11stance, an overvalued exchange rate cannot be sustained, once r "iinproven1ents" in n1arkets, wl1ich have Jed to more labor market flexibility, 
foreign exchange reserves are exhausted, and growth cannot continue at a rate ,--j may have exacerbated rnarket instability. 
greater than the increase in potential output (supply), once resources are fully -~ Many of the other so-called 1narket reforms have both exposed countries to 
utilized. I rnore shocks and weakened the auton1atic stabilizers - capital and financial 
To be sure that one is not on an unsustainable path, one actually has to 4 market liberalization and tariffication have enhanced the potential for external 
foresee infinitely far into the future. There can be paths that are dynamically -l shocks to disturb dornestic markets; and tlte n1ove fron1 defined benefit to 
efficient over any finite span of time but do not converge to the steady-state 
equilibrium (tiahn, 1966; Shell-Stiglitz, 1967). Standard equilibriun1 theory 
assurnes markets exist h1finitely far into the future- or that individuals behave 
as if there were such markets. 
In short, there are a number of circu1nstances in which the dynamics of the 
economy appear to change discretely. There can be crises. But these models 
are typically markedly different from the niodels that have dominated macro-
economic analysis in recent years (the Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium 
(DSGE) rnodels). 
1.1.1.2 Stable and unstable adjustments 
When an economy is disturbed from (say its full employment) equilibrium, 
there is a further question: are the underlying economic forces such that it 
will (quickly) return? Standard economic analysis focuses on equilibrium. It is 
assumed that somehow all individuals cart figure out precisely what needs to 
be done to restore the economy to the presu1ned equilibrium path. Of course, 
if there were a central planner calling off prices, he could iterate until he found 
the equilibriu1n, at which point the ecor1omy could proceed. But there is no 
such central planner, price adjust1nents occur in real ti1ne, and are rnade sep· 
arately by millions of price setters in the economy, and there is little theory to 
suggest that the way they set prices will converge quickly to the equilibrium. 
()ut of equilibrium trades have balance sheet effects, and themselves affect the 
future evolution of the ecor1omy. 
A closer look at the behavior of market processes suggests that the dyna1nics 
are ofte11 disequilibrating, that is, the initial response to sonie disturbances 
is to rnove the economy further away from equilibriurn. Thus, consider what 
happens when an adverse shock to aggregate de1nand leads to unemployment. 
Higher u11employment puts downward pressure on real wages, shifts the distri-
bution of income toward profits, a11d, if the share of profits that are consumed 
is lower than that of wages, this lowers aggregate demand furtlter. 21 Accelerator 
defined contribution pension prograrns, tl1e greater reliance on capital 
adequacy standards, rigidly enforced, and on simplistic rules, like balanced 
budget frameworks for governments, have weakened automatic stabilizers and 
sometimes replaced them with automatic destabilizers. 
Regimes for exchange rate adjustments reflect an ongoing debate 011 the rela-
tionship between 1narket flexibility and dynamic stability. As we noted, the 
fixed excha11ge rate systems of the past were viewed as introducing a rigidity 
in adjustrnent, which led to crises: they made adjustrnent costly, so that adjust-
ments occurred 011ly when the official exchange rate differed markedly from 
that which would have prevailed in the absence of government intervention. 
The resulting adjustments, when they occurred, were large, precipitating a 
"crisis." The hope was that moving to flexible exchange rates would enable 
adjustments to occur smoothly, so there would be no crisis. What has 11appe11ed 
in the forty years since tl1e abandontnent of the fixed exchange rate systern 
(especially in the last thirty years) has shown that that l1ope was misplaced. 
There continue to be crises, rnarked by sudden changes in exchange rates and/ 
or changes ir1 prices in financial 1narkets with concornitant large changes i11 
the level of econornic activity. 
In respo11se to some of the earlier crises, advocates of flexible exchange 
rates blamed governrnents frorn interfering in markets, trying to maintain 
a quasi~peg. It was governrnent, again, rather than rnarkets, that were the 
problem. But there were two problems with that co11clusion. First, and most 
importantly, crises (or at least sudden and rnarked changes in exchange rates 
or the prices of assets) occurred in countries where governments did not 
intervene. Secondly, it was clear that markets before the crises had underes-
timated the risk of these crises, and the resulting mispriciI1g (for exa1nple, of 
risk) had contributed to the magnitude of the crisis. The fact that, say, in the 
run up to the euro crisis, markets had lent so 1nuch n1oney on such favorable 
terms to Spanish borrowers (including Spanish banks) sitnply because it was 
part of the euro a11d on the presu1nption that therefore the debts could and 
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would be repaid contributed to the real estate bubble in that country. There 
was no 'vay of absolving markets of their failed judgments in helping create 
1nany of the crises around the wor!d.22 
Let 1ne relate the discussion of the past few paragraphs to the earlier dis-
cussion, which focused on a typology of equilibrium rnodels. That discussion 
was couched in terms of the usual non-stochastic dynan1ics. I didn't discuss, 
say, within the context of a model with a unique equiHbriu1n whether the con-
vergence to that equilibrium would be monotonic or fast In sorne cases, it may 
not be. There can even be lin1it cycles, where the economy does not converge 
to a stationary state. 
Witf1 stochastic processes, it sl1ould be clear that when there are multiple 
equilibria without stochastic elements, then the stochastic shocks could move 
the economy from an orbit of attraction for one equilibriurn to that of another. 
Even s1nall shocks could have large consequences, both in the short run and 
the long,23 
Moreover, large disturbances in more complex dyna1nic processes may entail 
complex processes of restoration of the original equilibrium - or a rnove to a 
new equilibrium. Thus, consider the proposition made earlier that consistent 
with any level of leverage, there is a full ernployment equilibrium. Leverage 
only affects the distribution of income. But at a given set of wages and prices, 
high leverage does depress consumption, lowering aggregate demand -
including demand for housing. If that happens, the adverse real balance sheet 
effects lower housing prices weaken consumption (and aggregate de1nand) 
further. Since the cost of housing includes the capital loss (gain), expectations 
of further losses (smaller gains) lowers demand further. That there 1nay be a 
configuration of prices and wages at which full employment is attained even 
with the existing level of debt is irrelevant: the short run dynamics of the 
economy has the economy in a downward spiral.24 
1.1.1.3 An important exception 
As l have noted, standard competitive equilibriu1n theory says that corre-
sponding to any initial set of endowrnents there exists a sets of wages and 
prices (extending infinitely far into the future) such that all 1narkets clear, that 
is, the demand for labor equals the supply of labor every period. There is full 
employment. So far, our attention has been focused on adjustment - on the 
possibility that the decentralized dynamics of a market economy do not lead 
to that equilibrium, or at least do not do so quickly. But there is another possi-
bility. 25 Today, markets for goods and labor at future dates (in a variety of states 
of nature) do not exist. Behavior today is affected by expectations of the prices 
(wages, interest rates) that will prevail in the future. Tl1ose expectations then1-
selves may not be market clearing. That is, even if there existed a future path of 
actual prices (including wages) at which 1narkets would clear at all dates, there 
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can also exist a path of expected prices (which may or may not be realized) at 
which markets don't clear. And the way that individuals form their beliefs 1nay 
be such that the path of expectations which would have resulted in rnarkets 
clearing (that is, full en1ploy1nent in every period) cannot be attained. 
It should be obvious that it would not have been rational for individuals to 
have assurned that t11e economy, in 2008, would quickly be restored to full 
employrnent. So, in a sense, it should be obvious that strictures of rational 
expectations cannot rule out these non-market clearing equilibriun1 (see also 
Neary and Stiglitz, 1983). 
Thus, if individuals, seeing a fa!! in prices, ar1ticipate that there will be 
further declines, and on the basis of that decide to postpone buying durables 
(including housing), price declines will not result in the hoped for increase in 
consu1nption and aggregate demand. Again, the natural dyna1nics could lead 
the econon1y further away fro1n the full e1nployrnent equilibrium. 
1.1.1.4 Asset prices, divergent expectations, and crises 
The fact that there can be sudden changes in expectations (whether rational or 
not) about the future means that there can be sudden changes in asset values, 
and that itself can lead to (reinforcing) sudden changes iI1 behavior, This is 
especially the case in the presence of financial constraints, where the envelope 
tl1eorem no longer holds. That is, in the absence of such constraints, an indi-
vidual optimizes, given his endowment, and a small change in endowment 
leads to a small change in behavior. But with binding financial constraints, a 
stnall change in c.sset values (say in the value that an individual can put up as 
collateral against a loar1) leads to a first-order change in behavior. 
In fact, history is replete with examples of credit and other bubbles that were 
almost surely irrational. Behavior was based on the belief that these bubbles 
would continue, in a way that was surely virtually impossible. So too, n1arket 
participants did not fully understand the implications of certair1 financial 
products or rules of the game,26 and while "rationality" inight not entail perfect 
understandings by aH market participants, the disparity betweer1 the world as 
they saw it, and the world as they should have seen it, rnakes clear that if it 
incredulous to dignify such beliefs as "rational." 
For instance, consider the variable rate 1nortgages that became fashionable in 
the run up to the subprin1e 1nortgage crisis. A supposed financial expert, Alan 
Greenspan, seemingly advised borrowers on the advantages of these 1nortgages, 
noting that had they taken out these 1nortgages say a decade earlier, they would 
have fared far better than they would l1ave with fixed rate 1nortgages. 27 There 
were two things that were striking about this advice (cautioned as it was by the 
observation that what happened in the past provides no assurance for what 
will happen in the future). First, if markets were based on rational expectations 
(and, ironically, (treenspan was ainong those who believed markets functioned 
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variable and a fixed rate rnortgage; the only difference was the pattern of risk, "f It would amount to the deleveraging that is often cited as needed in the current 
and that was n1uch worse (for the typical horneowner) with a variable rate "if_ - economic downturn. But achieving this rnay not be easy. Standard equilibrium 
rnortgage. Seco11dly, the Inain reason that variable rate mortgages had done -> theory identifies the set of wages and prices such that all markets (include that 
better during the previous decade was that Greenspan had lowered rates in an :,-, for labor) clear; however, typically no reference is made to past prices. History 
unprecedented tnartner, in a way that could not have beer1 built into expecta- ::-} matters only with respect to the stocks of inherited assets. But to go fron1 the 
tions and market prices at the time the mortgages would have been taken out. _';1 pre~crisis equilibrium, where demand was supported by a (possibly irrational) 
With interest rates at record lows, the likelihood of them falling further was I bubble, to the post-crisis equilibriun1 requires a large and dramatic change in 
small, and tl1e risk that they might rise (as they did) considerable. -.·:: 11~ price levels. I dwell on this exarnple not to berate the chairman of the Fed, but rather to There are two problems: First, it is hard for this to be achieved in a setting of 
-,,, 
e1nphasize that if seen1ingly sophisticated financial experts could get things ,':-"j- decentralized price and wage setting. Indeed, in that context, economic forces 
so wrong, what should we expect from ordinary 1nortals? We should not be move the economy in the opposite direction: there is a tendency for prices and 
surprised if they have beliefs that are suddenly disproved by a turn of events, ::--i wages to fall, increasing the debt burden, and decreasing aggregate de1nand. 
and that, when tl:1at happens, they suddenly c!1ange behavior. And sometimes -·_,1· Secondly, government (and especially monetary authorities) won't allow it. 
that sudden char1ge in behavior induces a crisis. That is the story of the euro If prices should soniehow jump in the way that would be required, they would 
,,','f 
crisis, which is the focus of the second part of this essay. "<_J worry that inflationary expectations would be brought into play. Moreover, 
- ' there is the question of whether prices could increase to the requisite level 
1.1.1.5 Debt, debt restructuring, and equilibrium dynamics 
But before turning to the euro crisis, there is one general application of the 
principles laid out in the previous sections that needs to be discussed, related to 
the problern of debt overhang. As we noted, debt siinply represents a claim on 
resources; it should affect the distributio11 of the "pie," not the size of the pie. 
Well-functioning markets should enable the economy to continue to operate 
at full employment. 
It is worth asking, then, what the putative equilibrium might look like. 
Ignoring, for the rnon1ent1 the relatively small changes in aggregate den1and 
that migf1t result fron1 changes in labor supply as a result of changes in wages 
and prices, the question then is - how can aggregate de1nand be restored to 
the level of aggregate supply? One possible answer is that there be a redistri-
bution from those with Low marginal propensities to consu1ne to those with 
a higher marginal propensity to co11sume. That niight be accomplished by a 
rnarked increase in wages, a 1noven1ent in wages the opposite of what normally' 
happens in an economic downturn, and one that is hard to reco11cile with an 
"equilibrium" theory in which real wages are equa1 to the marginal product-
ivity of labor; for so long as output is approximately the same (as before the 
crisis), the marginal productivity of labor will be (approxirnately) the sa1ne. (Of 
course, if the distribution of incorne is affected by the extent of successful rent 
seeking, then the distribution of income can be changed, but that will require 
political action.) 
Anottter possible answer is an ir1crease in wages and prices, for with debt 
contracts not being indexed, large increases in prices reduce the value of the 
debt owed by the (mostly poor) debtors to the (rnostly rich) creditors. 1'he 
'.· .•.. i' without accominodating n1onetary policy. 
The issue of inflationary expectations is more complicated than is sotnetimes 
suggested. For expectations are always conditional - that is, they are dependent 
-_'J on circumstances. Crises happen only rarely. Even if individuals believed, 
___ f on the basis of this one experier1ce in whicl1 a crisis goverrunent allowed a 
_::f sudden increae in the level of prices, that in the future it 111ight do so again, 
\'I the implications would be limited. It would neither mean that there would 
·- f be inflationary expectations going forward (they could and should rationally 
-1- expect that this was a one-time adjustinent in the price level, to obliterate the 
' I debt that was holding down the economy) or that there would be inflation 
I in non-crises periods. And given the rarity of crises, it would not mean that 
:--_f individuals' willingness to hold money would be significantly affected. (There 
· I '"' ' host of expe<iences in which such one-time •dju>tments h•ve ocnmed 
:-'._I without affecting future behavior, at least in out-of-crisis periods. It is not 
even necessarily rational for the1n to believe that it1 future crises, the econo1ny 
would respond in a similar way. Not only is the economic structure likely to 
be markedly different - normally, long tilne spans separate crises - but the 
government is likely to have cf1anged 1 and even thinking about how the gov-
ernment should respond to crises is likely to have changed.) 
By the same token, the fact tl1at the "once-and-for-all" increase in the price 
level will l1ave largely obliterated the value of the debts implies that individ-
uals would not be willing to lend. For all lenders recognize that there is a risk 
of loss, and a greater risk of loss with some loans than others (reflected in 
different risk premia). After crises in which significant capital losses have been 
incurred, individuals return to lending - and, indeed, even countries which 
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have defaulted on their debts typically return to the capital market after a rela-
tively short period of time. 2s 
In a sense, after any crisis so1neone risks a rnajor loss in the value of a key 
asset. The question is who, and how the loss occurs. In the current process, in 
which the economy reniains in a severe downturn for a prolonged period, it is 
owners of human capital tl1at experience large losses. In the East Asian crisis, 
in Korea, for instance, there were large numbers of bankruptcies. Equity values 
were wiped out, and creditors took considerable losses. The large char1ge in 
expectations necessarily leads, as we noted, to large changes in capital values. 
But the failure either to adjust prices or to restructure debts imposes additional 
deadweight losses resulting from the underutilization of resources, as a conse-
quence of deficiencies in adequate demand. 
There is an alternative way of restoring the economy to full employment, 
one that is not widely discussed in the context of the conventional competitive 
general equilibrium model, in which bankruptcy plays no role. At different 
prices (and wages) some individuals are unable to meet their debt obligatior1s, 
and there is, under bankruptcy law, a change in debt obligations and own-
ership claims. Different legal frameworks have different distributive conse-
quences - and therefore different consequences for aggregate demand at a 
particular moment in time. Thus, if I can fully discharge my debt if my current 
incon1e is less than my current debt obligations, there can be a large transfer of 
wealth from my creditors to rnyself, allowing me to increase my consumption 
today, and leading them by the same token to reduce their consumptiort.29 But 
if tny rnarginal propensity to consume is much larger than theirs, aggregate 
consumption will increase. Clearly, consumption today (and also aggregate 
deinand) will be different within a different legal framework, for instance, one 
in which student debt can never be discharged. 30 
1.1.1.6 Further mitigation of the adverse effects of debt crises 
We argued earlier that the real costs of a crisis often occur after the event (after 
the breaking of the bubble, or after the adjustrnent of the exchar1ge rate, for 
example), in the persistent underutilization of resources. Thus, policies directed 
at returning the econo1ny to full employmer1t are likely to greatly mitigate the 
cost of the crisis. Tf1e previous paragraph described how a well-desigr1ed bank-
ruptcy law, quickly enforced, could help do so. 
But crises eviscerate bank balance sheets, which irnpair lending, thereby 
weakening the econo1ny. (This is true both when a credit bubble bursts, or 
when exchange rates fall, and debtors have foreign denominated liabilities.) 
As Greenwald and Stig!itz (2003) have emphasized, there is specialized i11for-
mation, for example, about particular borrowers, ernbedded in banks. When 
bar1ks go bankrupt, tl1ere can be large costs associated with the resulting loss 
of institutional knowledge; but even short of bankruptcy, if banks' balance 
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sheets are weakened, lending will be constricted, in a way that cannot 
easily be compensated for, either by expanded lending by healthy banks or 
through capital markets (because of the important, pervasive information 
asymmetries). 
What is required then is the recapitalization of the banking systeut. 
Unfortunately, in the n1idst of a crisis, banks n1ay be neither willing nor able 
to do so. If they can get access to finance, especially equity, it may be at such 
disadvantageous terms that the owners of the banks are reluctant to take it. 
Access to liquidity - governn1ent lendiI1g - l1elps only a little; the problem is 
that with a shrunken balance sheet (equity), they are unwilling to undertake 
risky lending. Preferred shares are little different. 
Typically, govern1neots have succeeded in recapitalizing banks through a 
variety of opaque rnechanisrns. Regulations suppressing deposit rates allow 
thern to earn a Spread between the lending rate and the artificially low deposit 
rate. Government (reserve bank) lending at low interest rates (close to zero in 
the recent crisis), while allowing or encouraging banks to take that rnoney and 
invest it in higher yielding (government) assets is nothing more than a gift: 
it takes no genius to borrow at l/.i percent, lend to the gover11ment at 3 to 7 
percent, and 1nake a tidy profit. 
It is understandable that there are strong political objections to these 11on-
transparent redistributions to the banks, especially in the current context, where 
they are widely believed to have played a central role in causing the crisis and 
in exploitation. "Forced" recapitalization - a form of partial nationalization, 
where the banks are forced to take government equity- may be a:i1 effective way 
of inducing more lending, even if the banks' managers continue to act in the 
interest of the private shareholders. For the risks that the "private" owners face 
(including the risks that arise in the event of bankruptcy) has been reduced. 31 
For a sovereign facing a debt crisis, one major problerr1 is the deficiency of 
aggregate demand that arises from the transfer of funds to service the debt. 
While (again) there should be some configuration of wages and prices (and/or 
other policies) that would succeed in sustaining full employrnent, achieving 
that may 11ot be easy. Debt restructuring (partially reneging on the debt) is an 
alternative, just as it is in the case of private debt. But, unfortunately, there is 
no sovereigr1 debt bankruptcy "law," no sovereign debt restructuring mech-
anism. Tl1e result is that such restructuring, even when the discl1arge of the 
debt provides room for n1ore expansionary policies to restore the ecor101ny to 
full employment, often appear l1ighly risky. 
There has heen an extensive debate about the costs of such restructuring. 
Traditional models (Eaton and Gersovitz, 1981; Eaton, Gersovitz, and Stiglitz, 
1986) have emphasized the cost of losing access to credit. But more recent 
literature has questioned both theoretically and empirically whether that 
actually occurs, and, if so, the costs. 32 Rather, it appears that the costs are often 
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associated with the failure to adequately insulate dornestic institutions from ,--:j' 
the consequences of the debt default, that is, dornestic banks that have large ;-
1 holdings of governnient debt may becorne bankrupt, or sufficiently weakened 
that they are forced to curtail lending. But 1nuch of these costs are avoidable, if -~1 
the government anticipates them and takes countervailing actions, such as by --1 
recapitalizing the banks, as described above. 
Of course, creditors have every reason to scare debtor countries into believing 
that there will be strong adverse effects, effects which wiH be rnore severe the 
greater the n1agnitude of the debt restructuring. This is true even if prior to the 
crisis they had earned large excess returns, reflecting a risk that such a default 
n1ight occur. 
Argentina has shown that there can be "life after debt," life after a large eco-
nomic crisis, associated with a significant financial and currency crisis and a 
large debt restructuring. The debt and high exchange rate had irnposed a huge 
cost on the economy in the years before the crisis. The drarnatic adjustrnent in 
prices (exchange rates) and debt restructuring enabled the econon1y to return 
to robust growth, with 1nuch lower unemployrnent than in the years pre-
ceding the crisis, witl1 the governn1ent in a much stronger fiscal position, 
the current account restored to a sustainable position. No government - and 
especially a newly installed government - can fully plan for a crisis of the 
magnitude of that which occurred in Argentina. But what is clear is that they 
managed to "solve" in a reasonable way the host of distributional and other 
issues that had to be addressed in the process of the devaluation and debt 
restructuring. 
One might argue that the overall costs •vould have been reduced had 
Argentina restructured and devalued earlier.33 Jt is understandable why govern-
ments - fearful of the consequences, including the political consequences for 
their own fortunes - hesitate. A rnore orderly restructuring process, through a 
sovereign debt restructuring n1echanism, would reduce those fears, and hence 
the overall costs. 
Those in the financial market, by contrast, often seeni to want to increase 
those costs. They worry that if default (bankruptcy, sovereign debt restruc~ 
turing) is too easy, there will be an increase in defaults. That would necessitate 
an increase in interest rates. And that would reduce borrowing. But as Jeanne 
and Korinek (2012) have shown, there are macroeconomic externalities that 
arise from borrowing in foreign exchange. Markets by the1nselves are likely to 
lead to excessive borrowing. Surely the benefits to Argentine of its excessive 
borrowing in the 1990s was overshadowed by the costs it bore subsequently. 
Shnilar!y for Latin America in the 1970s. Arguably, then, the new equilibrium 
which would emerge - less borrowing, fewer debt crises, greater econon1ic sta-
bility, would be preferable to the current system marked by repeated crises and 












1.1.2 The fundamental flaws in the Euro Zone framework 
Theeuro was a political project, conceived to help bring the countries of Europe 
together. It was widely recognized at the time that Europe was not an optin1al 
curreI1cy area.34 Labor inability was limited, the countries' economies experi-
enced different shocks, and there were different Jong-terrn productivity trends. 
While it was a political project, the politics was not strong enough to create the 
economic institutions that n1ight have given the euro a fair chance of success. 
The hope was that over time, this would happen. But, of course, when things 
were going well, there was little impetus to "complete" the project, and when a 
crisis finally occurred (with the global recession that began in the United States 
in 2008) it was hard to think through carefully wl1at should be done to ensure 
the success of the euro. 
! and others who supported the concept of European integratior1 hoped that 
when Greece went into crisis, in January, 2010, decisive measures would be 
taken that would den1onstrate that the European leaders at least understood 
that further actior1s would be needed to enable the euro to survive. That did 
not happen, and quickly, a project designed to bring Europe together becan1e 
a source of divisiveness. Germans talked about Europe not being a transfer 
union - a euphen1istic and seemingly principled way of saying that they were 
uninterested in helping their partners, as they re1ninded everyone of how they 
had paid so much for the reunification of Ger1nany. Not surprisingly, others 
talked about the high price they had paid in World War IL Selective 1ne1nories 
played out, as Germans talked about the dangers of high ir1flation; but was it 
inflation or high unen1ploy1nent that had brought on the political events that 
fo11owed? 
Greece was castigated for its 11igh debts and deficits, and it was natural to 
bla1ne the crisis on excessive profligacy, but again there was selective n1en1ory: 
In the years before the crisis bit Spain and Ireland had low debt to GDP ratios 
and a fiscal surplus. No one could bla1ne tl1e crisis that these countries faced 
on fiscal profligacy. It was thus clear that Germany's prescription, that what 
was required were stronger and inore effectively enforced fiscal constraints, 
would not prevent a recurrence of crisis, and there was good reason to believe 
that stronger constraints - austerity - would make the current crisis worse. 
Indeed, by so rrianifestly showir1g that Europe's leaders did not understand the 
fundamentals underlying the crisis - or that if they did, by manifesting such 
enormous resistance to lHldertaking the necessary reforrns in the European 
fra1nework- they ahnost surely contributed to the 1narkets' lack of confidence, 
helping to explain why each of the so-called rescue rneasures was viewed -as 
only a temporary palliative. 
In the remainder of this section, I describe several of the underlying struc-
tural properties of the Euro Zone that, if they do not rnake crises inevitable, 
::,,:::,:r:a:~:hem mow ltkety to ocrnt. (What «tequiwd " not rn-~u~ ~~r""~' b~,~=' a ,e;ult of ftnanctal and macw-ecunomu1::::::n1:::::"~t1 
tl1e structural adjustment of the individual countries, but the structural --'-l This implies rnigration away frorn these highly indebted countries to those 
adjustrnent of the euro framework.) Many of these were rules that reflected ,'.fl- with Jess indebtedness, even when marginal productivities are the same; and 
the neoclassical model, with tl1e associated neoliberal policy prescriptions, : the 1nore individuals inove out, the greater the "equilibrium" tax burden on 
which were fashionable (in some circles) at the tirne of the creation of the -, the ren1ainder, accelerating the n1ove1nent of labor away from an efficient allo-
euro. Europe niade t\vo fundameI1tal rnistakes: first, it enshrined in its "consti- -1 cation.35 (Of course, in the short run, 1nigratior1 may have positive benefits 
tution" these fads and fashions, the concer11s of the time, without providing -_( to the crisis country, both because it reduces the burden of unemploynient 
enough flexibility in responding to changing circumstances and understand- ... 
1 
insurance, and as the remittances back home provide enhanced doniestic pur-
ings. And secondly, even at the time, the limits of the neoclassical model had chasing power. Whether in the short run these "benefits" to n1igration out-
been widely exposed - the problems posed, for instance, by imperfect compe- ','( weigh the adverse effects noted above is an ernpirical question. The 1nigration 
tition, information, and markets to which I alluded earlier. The neoclassical :'J_ also hides the severity of the underlying downturn, since it n1eans that the 
model failed to recognize the rnany market failures that require govern1nent --, unen1ploy1nent rate is less, possibly far less, tl1an it otherwise would be.)36 
intervention, or in which government intervention would improve the per- _-f Free mobility of capital and goods without tax harmonization can lead to an inef-
forinanct: of thl1e economh y.bThus, rr1ost importantly from a niacroeconomic -, --,l- ficient allocation of capital and/or reduce the potential for redistributive taxation, 
perspec 1ve, t ere was t e elief that so long as the governrr1er1t maintained "[ leading to high levels of after-tax and transfer inequality. Co1npetition a1nong juris-
a stable macro-economy- typically interpreted as maintaining price stability- f dictio11s can be ltealthy, but there can also be a race to the botto1n. Capital 
' overall eco11omic perforn1ance would be assured. By the same token, if the , J 
government kept budgets in line (kept deficits and debts within the limit set -_':I 
by Maastricht Convention) the econornies would "converge," so that the single , i 
currency system would work. The founders of the Euro zone seemed to think ,, 
that these budgetary/macro-conditions were necessary and essentially suffi- -_j 
cient for the countries to converge, that is, to have sufficient "similarity" that _:.!' 
a co1nmon currency would work. They were wrong. The founders of the Euro 
Zone were also focused on governn1ent failure, rather than market failure, and -I 
thus they circumscribed governments, setting the stage for the market failures -- --1 
that would bring on tl1e euro crisis. t 
Much of the fran1ework built into the Euro Zone would have enhanced I 
efficiency, if Europe had gotten the details right and if the neoclassical model were ---} 
correct. But the devil is in the detail, and some of the provisions, even within -1 
the neoliberal framework, led to inefficiency and instability. -
Free mobility of factors without a common debt leads to the inefficient and unstable , --
allocation of factors. The principle of free mobility is to ensure that factors move 
to where (marginal) returns are highest, and if factor prices are equal to rnar-
ginal productivity, that should happen. But what individuals care about, for 
instance, is the after-tax returns to labor, and this depends not only on the 
rnarginal productivity of labor (in the neoclassical rnodel) but also on taxes 
and the provi5ion of public goods. Taxes, in turn, depend in part on the burden 
imposed by inherited debt. Ireland, Greece, and Spain face high levels of inher-
ited debt. In these countries, tl1e incentive for outmigration, and is especially so, 
because that debt did not increase to its current levels as a result of investments 
in education, technology, or infrastructure that is, through the acquisition of 
goes to the jurisdiction wl1ich taxes it at the lowest rate, not where its rnar-
ginal productivity is the highest. To compete, otl1er jurisdictions rnust lower 
the taxes they irnpose on capital, and since capital is rnore unequally distrib-
uted than labor, this reduces the scope for redistributive taxation. (A sirnilar 
argument goes for the allocation of skilled labor.) Inequality, it is increasingly 
recognized, is not just a moral issue: it also affects the perfo1rr1ance of the 
economy in numerous ways (Stiglitz, 2012). 
Free migration might result in politically unacceptable patterns of location of eco-
no1nic activity. The general theory of migration/local public goods has shown 
that decentralized patterns of migration rnay well result in inefficient and 
socially undesirable patterns of location of econo1nic activity and concentra-
tions of population. There can be congestion and agglomeration externalities 
(both positive and negative) that arise frorn free migration. That is why 1nany 
countries have an explicit policy for regional develop1nent, atten1pting to offset 
the inefficient and/or socially unacceptable patterns e1nerging frorn unfettered 
markets. 
In the context of Europe, free migration (especially that arising fron1 debt 
obligations inherited from the past) may result in a depopulation not only 
of certain regions within countries but also of certain countries. One of the 
in1portant adjust1nent mechanisms in the lJnited States (which shares a 
connnon currency) is rnigration; arid if such rnigration leads to the depopu· 
lation of an entire state, there is lin1ited concern.37 But Greece or Ireland are, 
and should be, concerned about the depopulation of their countries. 
The single 1narket' principle fOr financial institutions and capital too can lead to a 
regulatory race to the bottom, with at least sotne of the costs of the failures borne by 
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other jurisdictions. The failure of a financial institution imposes costs on others 
(evidenced so clearly in the crisis of 2008), and governments will not typically 
take into account these cross-border costs. That is why either there has to be 
regulation by the host country (Stiglitz et al. 2010), or there has to be strong 
regulation at the European level. 
Worse still, confidence in any country's banking system rests partially in the con-
fidence of the ability and willingness of the bank's government to bail it out (and/or 
to the existence of institutional frarnewoiks that reduce the likelihood that a bailout 
will be necessary, that there are funds set aside should a bailout be necessary, and that 
there are procedures in place to ensure that depositors will be made whole). Typically, 
there is an implicit subsidy, from which banks in jurisdictions with govern-
ments with greater bailout capacity benefit. Thus, money flowed into tl1e 
United States after the 2008 global crisis, which failures in the lJnited States l1ad 
brought about, simply because there was more confidence that the United States 
had the willingness and ability to bail out its banks. Similarly, today in Europe: 
what Spaniard or Greek would rationally keep his money in a local bank, when 
tl1ere is (almost) equal convenience and greater safety in putting it in a Gern1an 
bank?38 Only by paying much higher interest rates can banks in those countries 
compete, but such an action would put them at a competitive disadvantage; and 
the increase in interest rates that is required may be too great - the bank would 
quickly appear to be non-viable. What happens typically is capital flight {or, 
in the current case, what has been described as a capital jog: the surprise is not 
that capital is leaving, but that it is not leaving faster). But that sets into motion 
a downward spiral: as capital leaves, the country's banks restrict lending, the 
economy weakens, the perceived ability of the country to bail out its banks 
weakens, and capital is further incentivized to leave. 
There are two more fallacies that are related to the current (and inevitable) 
failures of the Euro Zo11e. The first is the belief that there are natural forces for 
convergence in productivity, without government intervention. There cart be 
increasing returns (reflected in clustering), the consequence of which is that 
countries with technological advantages rr1aintain those advantages, unless 
tl1ere are countervailing forces brougl1t about by government (industrial) pol-
icies. But European competition laws prevented, or at least inhibited, such 
policies. 39 
The second is the belief that necessary, and almost sufficient, for good macro-
economic performance is that the monetary authorities maintain low and 
stable inflation. This led to the mandate of the European Central Bank to focus 
on inflation, in contrast to that of the Federal Reserve, whose mandate il1cludes 
growth, employrnent, and (now) financial stability. The contrasting mandates 
can lead to an especially counterproductive response to a crisis, especially 
one which is accompanied by cost-push inflation arising from high energy or 
food prices. While the Fed lowered interest rates in response to the crisis, the 
continuing inflationary concerns in Europe did not lead to matching reduc-
tions there. The consequence was an appreciating euro, witl1 adverse effects on 
European output. l"Iad the ECB taken actions to weaken the euro, it would have 
stirnulated the economy, partially offsetti11g the effects of austerity. As it was, it 
allowed the US to engage in competitive devaluation against it. 
It also meant that the ECB (and central banks within each of tl1e member coun-
tries) studiously avoided doing anything about the real estate bubbles that were 
n1ounting in several of the countries. This was in spite of the fact that the East 
Asian crisis had shown that private sector 1nisconduct - even when there is mis-
conduct in govemn1ent - could lead to an econon1ic crisis. Europe sirnilarly paid 
no attention to mou11ting current account balances in several of the countries. 
Ex post, many policymakers admit that it was a mistake to ignore these current 
account imbalances or financial rnarket excesses. But the ur1derlying ideology 
then (and still) provides no framework for identifying good "imbalances," 
when capital is flowing into the country because markets have rationally iden-
tified good investment opportunities, and those that are attributable to n1arket 
excesses. 
1.1.2.1 The immediate problem 
The most i1nmediate problern facing the Euro Zone is that creating a single cur-
rency took away two of the critical adjustment mechanisms (interest rates and 
exchange rates) and did not put anything in their place. The United States has 
an economic framework that deals with most of the problen1s described earlier: 
two-thirds of all governrnent expenditures occur at tl1e national level, and the 
states are restricted (by their own constitutions) from incurring debt, other 
than for capital projects.40 Most banks rely on federal deposit insurance. States 
are not restricted from engaging in "industrial policies," and poorer states have 
actively recruited firms to locate in their jurisdictions.4 t 
Sorrte hoped that internal devaluation would serve as an effective substitute, 
that is, there would be a faH in dorrrestic wages and prices. But there are three 
fundamental problems with this solution: (a) it is hard to coordinate such 
decreases, and, in the absence of such coordination, tl1ere can be large and costly 
changes in relative prices; (b) because debt is denominated in euros, and is not 
contingent on domestic wages and prices, debt burdens increase -witl1 adverse 
consequences for bankruptcy and disruption of the don1estic financial system; 
(c) the decrease in collateral values and incomes (especially relative to debts) 
~vould have tightened financial constraints, with first-order adverse effects on 
the economy. Most irnportantly, if internal devaluation were an effective sub-
stitute for norr1inal devaluations, then the gold standard would not have been an 
impediment to adjusting to the disturbances surrounding the Great Depressiort. 
The fact that those countries that abandoned the gold standard earlier did better 
is at least partially attributable to the resulting competitive devaluation. In the 
case of Argentina, before its 2001 crisis prices did fall, but not enough - again, an 
internal devaluation is not substitute for exchange rate adjustment. 
Europe has responded to the crisis by refusir1g to recognize that there were 
any fundamental structural problems in the EU arrangen1ents. Like tt1e IMF 
and the US Treasury in so 1nany other crises (including the 2008 crisis), it 
initially saw the problem as a liquidity crisis, a temporary loss of confidence; 
if the IMF, ECB and the Cominission showed that they stood behind each of 
the countries, confidence would be restored, and the crisis resolved. AU that 
was required was a te1nporary injection of funds (a loan to the bank or the 
country). But, of course, such loans don't irnprove the balance sheet of the 
country (or the bank), and if the problerns are niore fundamental, then they 
can have adverse effects on other clairnants, especially if the bailouts are senior 
to other creditors and even more so if a high interest rate is charged. That's 
why the East Asian bailouts and the Argentinean bailouts l1ad little discernible 
effect. It is not surprising that neither did the European bailouts; it is only sur· 
prising that Europe's leaders took so long to recogr1ize this. 
Later, the ECB lent money to the banks, to lend to the governments, to help 
support bond prices (lower sovereign yields), in the long-term refinancing oper-
ation (LTRO) program. Because the tnoney lent to the banks was ler1t at close 
to zero interest rate, and the banks could on lend the rnoney at n1uch higher 
interest rates, this progran1 was in effect a rnassive gift to European banks. The 
fact that European officials looked at the take-up of the progra1n as a 1neasure 
of "success" (as well as the te1nporary reduction in sovereign risk pre1niu1ns) 
was perhaps symptomatic of a lack of understanding of the underlying prob-
lems. To be sure, there were real effects from the hidden recapitalization of 
the banks. But the effects on sovereign risk pre1niu1ns were tetnporary: only 
coercion would induce then1 to permanently put a disproportionately large 
fraction of their balance sheet in these highly risky assets. 
Indeed, there was son1ething especially peculiar about Europe's attempt at a 
bootstrap operation, whereby lending to the governrnent would help bail out 
the banks, and !ending to the banks would help bail out the governn1ents. 
But at least this bootstrap attempt did not have the adverse effects of aus-
terity: predictably, austerity lowered growth, and as austerity spread across 
Europe, it helped bring on a Europe-wide recession, weakening the banks 
at the sanie time that it had disappointing fiscal benefits. As growth slowed 
and the ranks of the unen1ployed swelled, revenues declined (from what they 
otherwise would have been) and expenditures (for example, on unemploy1nent 
pay1nents) increased. 
European officials who prescribed austerity suggested, when these programs 
were first adopted,42 that by now those who adopted their programs would be on 
the way to restored prosperity.43 They have been wrong, and on repeated occa-






that their policies would bring about, and, as a result, they have consistently 
underestimated the fiscal benefit that would be derived: deeper downturns 
inevitably result in lower revenues and more expenditures for ur1employment 
and social programs, Though they then try to shift the blan1e back on to the 
crisis countries for missing the fiscal targets, the fact is that it is their mis· 
diagnosis of the problem and the resulting wrong prescription that should be 
held accountable. Spain and Greece are ir1 depression - there is no other way 
to describe the situation - and that depression is largely a result of misguided 
policies foisted on these countries (though their own leaders are to blame for 
having acquiesced, but their acquiescence was understandable; they saw the 
proposed solution as better than any alternative available to them). 
Today, the problem in Europe is an inadequate level of overall demand, and 
austerity exacerbates this problem. As the downturn cor1tinues, banks are less 
wiHing to lend, housing prices decline, and households become poorer and 
poorer, and rnore uncertain of the future, depressing consurnption further. 
No large econon1y - and Europe is a large economy - has ever emerged front 
a crisis at the sa1ne time that it has irnposed austerity. Austerity always, inev-
itably, and predictably n1akes matters worse. The only examples where fiscal 
stringency has been associated with recovery are in countries where reductions 
in government spending are offset by increases in exports. 'fhese are generally 
small countries, typically with flexible exchange rates, and where trading 
partners are growing robustly. But that is hardly the situation confronting 
Europe's crisis countries today: their n1ajor trading partners are in recession, 
and each has no control over its exchange rate.44 
European leaders have recognized that its problems will not be solved without 
a return to growth. But they have failed to explain how growth can be achieved 
with austerity. So too they assert that what is needed is a restoration of confi-
dence. Austerity will not bring about either growth or confidence. The failed 
policies on the part of Europe as it has tried, repeatedly, patchwork solutions, 
111isdiagnosing Europe's problerns, have under1nined confidence. Because aus-
terity has destroyed growth, it has also destroyed confidence, and will con-
tinue to do so, no matter how many speeches are given about the irnportance 
of confidence and growth. 
The austerity 1neasures have been particularly ineffective, because the 
rnarket understood that they would bring with them recessions, political 
turrnoH, and disappointing improvements in the fiscal position, as a result of 
a decline in tax revenues. Rating agencies downgraded countries undertaking 
austerity rneasures, and rightly so. Spain was downgraded as the first austerity 
rneasures were passed: the rating agency believed that Spain would do what 
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riow to design such a system (in a way that did not lead to excessive borrowing) 
would take me beyond this paper. For now, ! simply note: The position of some 
in Europe against such mutualization - that Europe is not a transfer union - is 
wrong on two counts. (a) It exaggerates the risk of default, at least the risks of 
default if debt is rnutualized. And (b), at low interest rates, most of the crisis 
countries should have no trouble servicing their debts.46 
those currently afflicted witl1 crisis, structural reforms take time. They affect 
long-term standards of living, but structural rigidities did not precipitate the ,'I 
crisis. It was a financial and real estate crisis that did that.~5 Most of the struc- .· 1 
tural reforms are supply-side measures, but, as I noted, the problem today is an 
inadequacy of demand; worse, many of the structural reforrns will exacerbate :' j 
that problern, especially those which lead to lower wages and have adverse dis- I 
tributior1al effects. :i 
1.1.2.2 Responding to the crisis 
"fhis analysis of the fundan1ental flaws ur1derlying the Euro Zone suggests a 
set of policies which might help resolve the crisis. I say might: these reforms 
are necessary to make the euro work, but they are not necessarily sufficient. 
1'he divergence between an optin1al currency area and tl1e Euro Zor1e - the 
divergences, for instance, in economic structures whicl1 can give rise to desired 
char1ges in exchange rates, eitl1er in the short run (in response to shocks) or in 
the long rur1 (in response to systemic differences in productivity and inflation 
trends) - n1ay be too large to make a system of a single currency work. 
1.1.2.3 Mutualization of debt 
The first necessary reform is a common fiscal framework - more than and fun-
damentally different from an austerity pact, or a strengthened versio11 of the 
Stability and Growth pact. As I noted, it was not overspending by goverr1ment 
that brought on Spain or Irelartd's proble1ns. 
One of the fundame11tal problems confronting the Euro Zone is tf1at current 
arrangernents effectively meant that countries were borrowing in a currency 
over which they had no control - much like deve.Ioping and emerging markets 
who borrowed in dollars or euros. The fact that it was their own currency was 
of some, albeit liinited, help. There is no risk that the US will ever default on 
its debt, owed iI1 dollars, simply because it controls the printing presses (a fact 
that at least one of the rating ager1cies seems unaware of). The value of those 
dollars might dirninish were it to resort to such rneasures, but (politics aside) 
there is unlikely to be any event of sufficient mornent to change expectations 
of inflation so dramatically as to bring on a crisis. 
What is required then is "n1utualization" of debt- European-wide debt, owed 
in euros. This would make Europe's debt similar to America's debt, and with 
Europe's overall debt to GDP lower than that of the US, presumably interest 
rates would be comparable. Such mutualization would lower interest rates, 
aHowing more spending to stimulate the econo1ny and restore growth. 
The mutualizaton of debt could be accomplished through a number of insti-


















Of course, in the absence of debt mutua!ization, there is a serious risk of 
partial default (which has already happened in the case of Greece). The irony 
is that existing arrangements may actually lead to larger losses on the part of 
creditor countries that a system of well-designed niutualization. 
Any system of successful economic integration must involve some assistance 
from the stronger countries to the weaker. (The desirability of such transfers, 
even in the absence of economic integration, was evidenced by the Marshall 
Plan after World War II. Europe itself has provided substantial funds to 11ew 
entrants, to enable their economies to converge.) 
1.1.2.4 A common financial system 
The second necessary reform is the estab!is!unent of a co1n1non banking systeni -
with deposits insured by a Europe-wide deposit insurance fund, and with 
co1nrnon regulations and a common approach to resolution of insolvent banks. 
I have already explained why a corrunon deposit insurance fund is required: 
without such an institution, funds will flow from the banking system of "weak" 
countries to the banks in strong countries, further weakening those that are 
already experiencing difficulties. But without a con1mon regulatory systen1, a 
system with a common deposit insurance scheme could be open to abuse. 
However, a common regulatory system should have scope for taking different 
macroprudential stances in different countries, or even regions within a 
country. We described earlier how having a single central bank took away an 
important instru1nent of adjustn1ent - the interest rate. But there are a host 
of other regulatory provisions (such as capital adequacy requirements) which 
can be adjusted depending on the n1acroeconomic circunistances.47 Lending 
standards for rnortgages should, for instance, be tightened at a place or tinH.' 
where there appears to be a risk of a bubble for1ning.48 
If the euro is to survive, further reforms that are desirable- and perhaps even 
necessary- entail a move toward tax harrnonization, restricting the race to the 
bottoin in capital taxation, and distortions caused by tax competition among 
countries. Industrial policies that would allow those behind to catch up are 
necessary to prevent further divergences within the countries of Europe. 
1.1.2.5 Towards debt restructuring 
For 1nost Euro Zone economies, these reforrns would suffice - for now. But 
there 1nay be son1e countries (like Greece) where the cun1ulative irnpact of past 
mistakes (both their own past budgetary rnistakes and those that were foisted 
upon them in the early responses to the crisis) are such that n1ore is 11eeded. 
They will have to restructure their debts. 
Debt restructuring (as I argued in the first section of this essay) is an esse11tial 
part of capitalism. Every country has a bankruptcy law that facilitates the 
restructurir1g of debts in an orderly way. l'hough after the Argentine crisis, 
there were calls for the creation of sovereign debt restructuring mechanisms, 
one of President Bush's many sins was to veto that initiative. In the subsequent 
years, when there were no sovereign debt crises, there was little concern about 
the issue. Elsewhere, I have described what such a mechanisrn might look like 
(Stiglitz, 2010b. see also Stiglitz and Zandi, 2012). But in the absence of such 
a n1echanism1 countries have to act on their own - as Argentina showed is 
possible. 
But if some country needs debt restructuring to enhance growth, this should 
be done quickly and deeply. And one should not feel too sorry for the credi-
tors: Lenders have been receiving high interest rates reflecting such risks.49 
By the same token, as we noted earlier, the costs to tl1e econon1ies doing the 
restructuring may be less than is widely suspected. Both theory and evidence 
suggests tl1at countries that do such restructuring can regain access to global 
financial markets; but even if, going forward, cou11tries l1ave to rely on tl1eir 
own savings, the adverse consequences may be far less than the benefits they 
receive from the debt restructuring.50 
Argentina has also shown that there is life after debt and the reform of mon-
etary arrangements. Indeed, there are good reasor1s to believe that a deep debt 
restructuring will have positive benefits- providing more fiscal space for expan-
sionary policies, so long as the government does not have a primary deficit. 
It is important that the debt write-down be deep - otherwise the lingering 
uncertainty about the possibility of another debt restructuring will cast a pale 
over the recovery. And because of the uncertainty about future growth, and 
therefore of debt sustainability, GDP-indexed bonds n1ay represent an effective 
form of risk-sharing (which can be thought of, at the sovereign level, as the 
equivalent of the conversion of debt into equity, at the corporate level) (see 
Miller and Zhang (2014), Griffith-Jones (2014)). 
1.1.2.6 The end of the euro? 
The analysis of this paper l1as suggested that prospects that the 17-nation Euro 
Zone will survive, in its current form, without significant reforms, are bleak. Its 
er1d, as its creation, is as much a matter of politics as of economics. European 
leaders continually affirm their cornniitrnent to do what is required to sustain 
it; but, at the same tin1e, key European leaders have shown that they do not 
seem to understand what is required to sustain it, and have ruled out many of 
the necessary measures. They have continually repeated a mantra - that one 
has to restore confidence and grow the econorny- as they have simultaneously 
undertaken measures that have undermined 1011g term confidence and have 
put the economy into recession. 
Even when most European leaders seern to gradually grasp what is required, 
there are two fundamental problems: (i) can they achieve the unanimity 
required, given differences in the perspectives and interests and politics in 
the different countries; and (ii) can they achieve the requisite agreements fast 
enough? The incongruity between the pace of markets and that of the politics 
could present a problem for the survival of the euro. Indeed, the slow pace 
at which the fu11da1nental problerns are being addressed is already causi11g 
problems: tl1e financial sector of the crisis countries continues to be weak-
er1ed, both as austerity exerts its toll on the economy and as capital leaves the 
country. This means that the magnitude of the assistance tl1at eventually may 
be required is likely to be far greater than it would have bee11 had the reforn1s 
been undertaken earlier. 51 
Many European leaders have recognized that eventually a single banking 
framework, with con1rr1on regulations, deposit insurance, and resolution, is 
necessary. But sorne European leaders argue that such a dramatic reforn1 must 
be done carefully, in a step-by-step process. First, there mus.t be cornmon regu-
lations, and only when the regulatory system has been "proven" can Europe 
go on to the 11ext stage(s). Were there not an ongoing crisis, such an argument 
would have some 1nerit. But those with capital in, say, the Spa11ish banks will 
not wait: the benefits of waiting are nil, the risks are substantial. And so, while 
European leaders dither, the banking systen1 1nay be effectively destroyed. 
ECB lending (in the unlimited amounts promised, provided that the 
country requests it and subjects itself to conditionality) may delay the day 
of reckoning. But one should be clear that the issue facing, say, tl1e Spanish 
banks is not just one of liquidity. If the fu11ds are accompanied by the kinds 
of austerity conditionality that has marked earlier programs, unaccompanied 
by any program that would lead to growth, then the banks will continue to 
weaken; and even the a11ticipation that this might be so will contribute to 
funds leaving the bank. What is necessary for a return of "confidence" in the 
banking system is: (a) a belief that further losses will be limited; and (b) the 
government ·has the resources and willingness to rescue the bank, should it 
run into problems. But under current policies, not only are the banks losses 
likely to continue to mount, the government's ability to rescue the banks will 
continue to deteriorate. 
Alternatively, those with funds in Spanish banks might be willing to keep 
their funds there, were they confident that Europe will step into the breach. 
But Europe's equivocation has not helped, as Northern Europe has attempted-to 
lin1it its exposure, responding to domestic political pressures. After recognizing 
that there needs to be a common financial fran1ework, again there appears 
to be some backtracking: it has been suggested that perhaps only the large 
banks sl1ould be included. (Wl1ile the failure of a single stnall bank would not 
itself cause large systemic effects throughout Europe, the failure of a nun1ber 
of small banks could; and what is at stake is not just "systernic risk" of Europe's 
financial system, but the capacity of the Spanish banking systern to provide 
credit, especially to SM E's, and this credit 1nay be even more dependent on the 
strength of the smaller banks than on that of the larger banks.) 
There is likely to be turmoil in the process of the restructuring of ti1e Euro 
Zone, and the resulting downturn could be significant. But under the current 
regirne, the prospects for crisis countries are truly bleak: For sorne, depression 
as far as the eye can see. Europe has offered no alternative vision. 
The current regin1e is also undermining the legitimacy of democratic eco-
no1nic institutions. The European project was a top-down initiative. There was 
a very short period of prosperity52 - based in some countries on access to credit 
at irrationally low interest rates. The prornises of sustained prosperity were not 
fulfilled. Not only did sustained rnacroeconomic growth not n1aterialize, but 
inequality increased, and governn1ents have been restrained in their ability to 
redress growing inequities. Evidently, the elites created a syste1n that seen1s to 
have done well for those at the top. 
In many quarters, there is concern about tlte ceding of effective econoniic 
power - originally to Brussels' bureaucrats, but increasingly to Gern1an politi-
cians - undermining national democracies. 
There are a variety of ways in which the current form of the Euro Zone might 
end. There was, of course, in its creation the assumption that it would never 
end (though monetary arrangen1ents have had to be changed frequently), and 
so there was no provision for contingencies sin1ilar to that which the Euro 
Zone is now facing. It might be ended by the ECB refusing to discount the bi!ls 
of the banks of a 1nen1ber country - in effect, ceasing to act as a central bank 
for that country, and forcing the country's old central bank to resume that role. 
It rnigllt end in a popular uprising against the continued depression forced on 
the crisis countries by Europe's leaders. 
While, however, the break-up of the euro if it occurs is likely to be costly, 
there are some ways of reducing those costs. There is growing agreen1ent 
among econon1ists that the least costly fonn of break-up would en tall Germany 
leaving the euro. The "new euro" (so defined) would almost surely depreciate 
relative to the German mark, correcting current account imbalances within 
Europe, strengthening growth in crisis countries, and enabling those countries 
to more easily nieet their debt obligations. 
At the san1e tin1e, the stronger mark would enable Germany to meet its debt 
obligations easily. Some creditors 1night feel that they were cheated, being 
paid back in the depreciated (new) euro; but credit contracts are typically 
unindexed, and there are a host of contingencies which affect the real value 
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of what is repaid. Creditors receive a risk pretnium for bearing those risks. 
Whatever happens has distributive consequences; other ways of having the 
Euro Zone dissolved entail adverse effects on borrowers. 
1.1.3 Concluding comn1ents 
Most crises are n1anmade. They are not caused by fa1nines or other natural 
disasters. They are often the result of unstable market processes - rather than 
a sudden change in governinent policies. On tl1e other hand, government pol-
icies can affect both the likelihood of the occurrence of crises and also their 
consequences. Governi:nent policies car1 affect countries' exposure to risk, the 
structural stability of the system and impede or facilitate adjustments. The 
elimination of automatic stabilizers, and their replaceinent in son1e cases by 
auton1atic destabilizers, has introduced new instabilities into the econo1nic 
system. Deregulation and financial and capital market liberalization has 
provided new opportunities for destabilizing 1narket processes and opened 
up new channels by which the instabilities in one country can affect others 
(Stiglitz et al. 2006). 
We have seen how institutional changes surrounding the Euro Zone -
intended to create a more stable and prosperous econo111y- played out in ways 
that were, at the tiine of the founding of the euro, largely unanticipated, but 
which - at least in hindsight - were totally understandable given the structural 
flaws in t11e Euro Zone institutional arrangernent. We have seen too how the 
policy responses to tl1e crisis, as it unfolded, have, in rnany cases, only n1ade 
matters worse. 
There are alternative policies ~vhicl1 would enhar1ce stability, and, once a 
crisis has occurred, would be rnore likely to restore the economy to prosperity. 
But to adopt these policies one has to break out of the straitjacket of market 
fundamentalism/neoliberalism and much of conventional economics. 
1"here was no sudden change in the underlying state variables describing the 
E.uropean econon1y: no war that wiped out large fractior1s of its physical and 
hurr1an capital stock, nor even an innovation or an econorr1ic transforrnation 
that would have led to rapid obsolescence. There have been sudden changes in 
expectations, and in our understandings: we know (or at least we should now 
know) that markets are not necessarily quickly self-correcting, that underregu-
lated markets can give rise to bubbles and credit excesses, the fact that Greece 
or Spain have the sante currency as Gerrnany does not mean that Greek or 
Spanish debt is as safe as that of Germany, and it may not even fully eliminate 
exchange rate risk and, in ways that we have explained, may actually increase 
default risk. 
Crises are complex events, and it is inevitably overly simplistic to try and find 
a single-causal explanation. However, it should be clear that the euro crisis, 
like so many other crises, is attributable rnore to market excesses than to gov-
ernment profligacy. If government is to be blamed, it is for a failure to tame the 
(repeated) market excesses. (And even when there is govern1nent profligacy, 
the market is almost always a co-conspirator - lending excessively on easy 
terms, in its irrational opthnism about the prospects of repayment.) Prevention 
entails understanding l1ow to curb the excesses, and how to design institu-
tional arrangements that limit the opportunity for sucl1 excesses. Resolution 
entails u11derstanding how to ensure that, after a crisis, resources are put back 
to use as quickly as possible. 
With or without such excesses, economies are exposed to shocks: different 
111stitutional arrange1nents increase the exposure to such shocks, amplify the 
effects, make the effects more persistent, and impede adjustment, thereby 
also increasing the risk of a crisis. Market forces by themselves 1nay not only 
lead to e11dogenous disturbances (like bubbles), but may respond to shocks 
irl a destabilizing way. Government intervention (for example, through debt 
restructuring, counter-cyclical macro policies, and well-designed bank recapi-
talizations) can reduce the enormous costs that have traditionally been associ-
ated with crises. 
Crises are perhaps an inherent feature of capitalism. But they do not have to 
be as frequent, as deep, and as costly as they have been. 
The standard macroeconomic models ignored history- capitalism had always 
been rnarked by large fluctuations, with great suffering. The models ignored 
key market failures that help explain persistent inefficiencies and instabilities. 
In doing so, they may have violated the central principle of Hippocrates: do no 
harm. For the policies and institutional arrange1nents based on these sin1plistic 
models and theories created the preconditions for these crises and have contrib-
uted to the slow recovery from this Great Recession - a downturn which, while 
riot as deep as the Great Depression, may begin to rival it in duration. 
Notes 
1 Paper presented to an International Economic Association Roundtable on "Debt 
Crises - l-Iow to prevent them, how manage them, how to ensure there is life after 
debt" held in Buenos Aires, August 13-14, 2012, and co-sponsored by University of 
Buenos Aires (UBA). lam indebted to the participants in the conference, and especially 
to iny discussant, Martin Guzman to Daniel Heymann, and to Sandesh f)hungana, 
for helpful comments. Many of the ideas discussed in this paper are the result of joint 
work undertaken with rny long term co-author Bruce Greenwald. I would also like to 
acknowledge the research assistance of Ritam Chaudry and Ea1non Kircher-Allen. In 
the years intervening between the presentation of the paper and its publication, the 
curocrisis, the subject of the second part of the essay, has evolved. For the most part, I 
have left the distussion as it was, to convey the sense of the debate at that tlme. Most 
of what I work then remains rel event as this paper goes to press. 
2 Reinhart and Rogoff (2009). 
+. 
3 There is, of course, by now ample evidence against the ration a I expectations hypothesis. 
See Akedof (2002); Fuster, Laibson, and Mendel (2010); and Stig!itz (201 l). 
4 There is a slight caveat to these claims: a dramatic change in expectations (for 
instance, the realization that there was a real estate bubble that just burst) changes 
the composition of demand, and the capital stock that was appropriate for the pre-
vious output mix may be less so for the new demand structure. Jn addition, there 
are rneasurement problems: n1easured output before the crisis was inflated by the 
bubble real estate prices and by the seeming associated profits in the financial and 
real estate sectors. See, for example, Stiglitz et al. (2010). 
Moreover, the real puzzle ls the slow recovery of employment: even if the capita! 
stock were partially "destroyed," standard theory says that labor should be fully 
utilized. Much of the loss of output - the difference between actual output and 
potential output - arises from the persistence of high levels of unen1p!oyment. 
5 See Fisher (1933). 
6 That is, it takes time to rebuild balance sheets, and because of iu1portant information 
imperfections and asymmetries, there is, in effect, equity rationing (Cireenwald, 
Weiss, and Stiglitz, 1984), so that firms (including banks) cannot instantaneously 
raise additional equity on the capital 1narket to replace capital that has been lost 
as a result of an adverse shock. For an overview, see Greenwald and Stiglitz (2003). 
For a rnore recent discussion of balance sheet recessions, see Rithard Koo (2008 and 
2010). 
7 Roubini (2008) and Wolf (2008). 
8 Though some economists have seen a connection between the two: the recycling 
of Chinese surpluses, so1ne argued, helped fuel the bubble. But as Stigl!tz (2010) 
argues, there was no necessity either that these surpluses lead to low US interest 
rates (the Fed still had a role in setting interest rates) or that the ready supply of 
finance be allocated so poorly (in part a result of inadequate regulation). 
9 In a more probabilistic context, it may be rational for countries to incur sufficiently 
high debt such that, with a non-zero probability, there are events that result in a 
credit constraint being binding, that ls, countries will not be able to borrow further, 
or may not even be able to roll over their debt (Eaton and Gersovitz, 1982, and 
Eaton, Gersovitz, and Stiglitz, 1986). But the frequency of debt trises and the costs 
that they impose suggest that this "rational theory of excess indebtedness" cannot 
explain what is going on. An alternative explanation, not pursued in this paper, 
focuses on political economy considerations: the benefits of higher levels of indebt-
edness accrue to politicians at one tin1e, the costs (for exarnple, associated with the 
subsequent crisis) octur at a later date, and will therefore likely be borne by other 
politicians. Jn effect, the political process leads to discounting the future costs of 
the crisis at a high rate. This theory suggests that there are severe lilnits to demo-
cratic accountability, for example, that voters too are myopic or that the political 
process gives \Veight to those that are myopic. 
10 Thus, as Delli Gatti et al. (2012a and 2012b) eniphaslze, the association noted by 
Reinhart and Rogoff, between long casting crises and financial crises tells us little -
much less than they suggest. The collapse of Arnerica's banking system in the (;reat 
Depression, for in5tance, occurred well after the onset of the downturn; it was con-
sequence more than cause. 
JI As of April 2013, real private nonresidential fixed investment in the United States 
\Vas just 1.3 percent below lts pre-crisis high. Real gross domestic private investn1ent 
was still 8.4 percent below the pre-crisis high. Source: St. Louis Fed. 
12 See Delli (Jatti et a!. (2012a and 2012b), 
'¥'AJ ier vem 
13 Weak balance sheets on the part of some local banks and !ow real estate price5 may, 
however, continue to impair lendl ng to small and medium sized enterprises. Excessive 
household leverage n1ay lead to lower levels of consurnptlon, but it is not likely (or 
plausible, at least with rational markets) that savings rates wil! fall much below their 
ctnrent levcL The low savings rates observed prior to the crisis entailed the bottom 
80 percent of An1cricans spending 110 percent of their incomes, on average. 
14 Such multiple equilibria arise often in game theoretic rnodels: if everyone believes 
that there will not be a run on the bank, there won't be; but if they do, there will be. 
See Diamond and Dybvig (1983). Early examples arose in standard growth theory 
where capitalists had a relative preference to the capital intensive good. They arise 
too naturally in sin1ple overlapping generations models: if individuals believe the 
interest rate next period will be low, they may save a great deal to ensure that they 
have an adequate amount for retiren1ent; and if they do that, there will be a low 
interest rate the following period, But if they think the interest rate i5 going to be 
high, they will save little; and the interest rate will be high. See Stiglitz (2008). See 
also the extensive literature on sunspot equilibria. 
15 Though as we have already noted (and we will cornment on further below) in any 
1nodei providing a good description of the actual behavior of the economy, the 
assurnption of rationality and rational expectations plays a less central role than in 
the paradigm that has do1ninated rnacroeconoinics for the past quarter-century. 
16 Sec, for example, Gucsnerie (2001) aod Cass and Shell (1983). 
17 Indeed, shocks to trend variables can lead to defaults in models with rational 
expectations. Even small shocks to trends can generate large changes in the present 
discounted value of future income. See Agular and Gopinath (2006). 
18 It is also true that so1ne of the "bad" behavior was rationally exploiting institu-
tional flaws (for example, "too blg to fail" banks have an incentive to engage in 
excessive risk taking), and some was a result of inherent market flaws arising out 
of imperfect and asymmetric information (for example, deficiencies in corporate 
governance leading to "incentive" structures designed to encourage excessive risk 
taking.) Because most crises involve a co1nbination of irrational expectations and 
ratlonal exp!oltation of institutional flaws, it is not possible (or even ineaningful) to 
parse out the relative contribution of each. In principle, we could have a crlsis fed 
solely, say, by rational expectations exploiting institutional deficiencies. 
19 Irrationalities were evidenced not only in the size of the mortgages, but also in their 
forn1, in the ratlng agencies' ignoring the risk of correlated defaults and that. the 
new forms of mortgages might have significantly higher default rates than trad-
itional mortgages, in investors ignoring the perverse incentives of those originating 
mortgages, those packaging them, and the rating agencies, etc. See Stiglitz (2010). 
20 If anything, the fact that the government was willing to be so transparent should 
have been reassuring to the n1arket. 
21 The standard objection to the investment accelerator is that if rational individuals 
had anticipated the decline in output, they would not have made the investments 
in earlier periods. The invest1nent accelerator, in this view, depends on irrational 
expectations. But the discussion above should have 1nade it clear that if there is 
uncertainty in the growth path of the economy (either because of exogenous ~hocks 
or endogenous) then it iS possible that firms could have rationally over-invested, that 
is, there were other possible trajectories (conceivable, even plausible at the time at 
which the investments were niade, which would have justified these investments). 
22 In Globalization and its Discontents (2002), I describe similar irrationalities at play in 
the East Asian crisis. 
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23 Thus, as noted eadier in footnote 7, a shock could 1nove the economy from a situ-
ation where a credit constraint was not binding to one where it was, from a situation 
where it could roll over its debt (and ther('fore did not face a credit crisis), to one 
where it cannot roll over its debt. 
24 That dynamics of adjustment could be disequillbrating has Jong been recognized. 
See, or example, Neary and Stiglitz (1982). Standard theory assunies that somehow 
prices adjust instantaneously, and the econo1ny smoothly moves to the long run 
rational expectations equilibrium, even if previous expectation5, which proved so 
wrong, were believed to be rationals. 
25 Beyond that which arises from other market imperfections, such as those associated 
with imperfect and asynunetric information, which can give rise to non-market 
clearing equilibrium. 
26 That is certainly the case for many of the mortgage products and structured financial 
product5 that were sold in the years prior to the 2008 crisis. See, for exan1ple, Stiglitz 
(2010). 
27 See Alan Greenspan, "Understanding Household Debt Obligations," remarks at 
the Credit Union National Association 2004 (1overnmental Affairs Conference, 
Washington, l)C, February 23, 2004. Available at http://www.federalrcserve.gov/ 
boarddocs/speeches/2004/20040223/default.htm. 
28 See, for exa1nple, Borensztein and Fanizza (2008). 
29 The two n1ay not be fully offsetting. without the bankruptcy, the creditor might in 
the end have been paid at n1ost a fraction of what was owed. Indeed, because of the 
1nacro-economic benefits, these redistributions may even be Pareto improving. 
30 In the midst of a cri5is, there may be a need for an expedited debt restructuring, on 
a scale beyond that envisaged in normal bankruptcy !aw, though a "super chapter 
IL" Sec Miller and Stiglltz (2010) and Stiglitz (2000). 
31 There are other mechanisms, such as partial insurance of new lending, or even 
better, the sale of macro-indexed Arrow-Debreu securities, where the bank iS inde1n-
nlfied if the overall economy's etvno1nic performance is weak, resulting in a default 
rate that is higher than it otherwise would have been. 
32 See, for exanip!e, Stiglitz (2010b) and the other papers in this volu1ne. 
33 Orzag and Stiglltz (2002) di5cuss the optimal time to call the fire department - that 
is, the optimal time to ask for assistance (a bailout) or to restructure. 
34 See Mundell (1961). 
35 Interestingly, this problem has Jong been recognlz.ed in the theory of fiscal feder-
alisn1/local public goods. Sec, for example, Stiglitz (1977, 1983a, 1983b). 
36 By the same token, if some of the burden of taxation is imposed on capital, it will 
induce capital to move out of the country. 
37 Some see an advantage: buying influence over that country's 5enators because less 
expensive. 
38 The exit from Spanish bank5 while significant - and leading to a credit crunch - has 
been slower than some had anticipated. This in turn is a consequence of institu-
tional and inarket i!nperfcctions (for example, rules about. knowing your customer, 
designed to lin1it money laundering), which interestingly the neo-classical model 
underlying much of f,urope's policy agenda ignored. There is far les5 of a single 
market than it is widely thought. 
39 Even the World Bank has changed its views on industrial policies; yet views about 
industrial policies are to a large extent enshrined in the Euro Zone's basic eco-





40 These constitutional requirements have, in recent years, been subverted by the cre-
ation of unfunded pension liabilities, which may create within the states son1e of 
the same adverse dynamics described earlier for Europe. 
41 Though this has created, to some extent, the race to the bottom, the adverse dynamic 
that we described as characterizing Europe. 
42 For example, British Conservative Prime Minister David Cameron in his April 2009 
speech, "The Age of Austerity.'' expounded on austerity not just as a short·term 
strategy but as a philosophical shift that would restore the vibrancy of Britain's 
economy. Without it, he said, "[W]e risk becorning once again the sick nian of 
Europe. ()ur recovery will be held back, and our children will be weighed down, by 
a n1illstone of debt." The actual results of austerity in Britain have not lived up to 
his prornises, to say the least. 
43 This section is a revised version of the preface to Stlglitz {2012). 
44 Alesina and his co-authors have tried to propagate the idea that there can be expan-
sionary contractions. But there is a growing consensus that their analyses are badly 
flawed, and that that is not the case. See, for example, chapter 3 of IMF (2010), Baker 
(2010), and Jayadev and Konczal (2010). 
45 As is the case in the United States, there 1nay be deeper problems: structural trans-
formation that is required by the decline in manufacturing employment and 
globalli.ation. 
46 The exception ls (;reece, for which there has already been debt restructuring. 
47 One of the lessons of the crisis was that monetary authorities relied excessively on 
interest rates. 
48 Evidenced, for instance, by a rapid increase in housing prices relative to income, or 
by an abnonnal!y rapid expansion of credit. 
49 Or they should have done so, had they done thelr due diligence. 
50 As the paper by Sanderlis {2013) points out, the costs may be less related to those 
imposed externally, and more related to failures of the government to deal effect-
ively with the internal disturbances associated with debt restructuring, e.g. to the 
financial system (banking, insurance, and pensions). 
51 The slow pace of refonns has led to other problems: Ireland, one of the first coun-
tries to receive assistance, is concerned that later countries will get a better ndeaLff 
52 Monetary arrangements often have a short life span - witness the ERM. Even the 
Bretton Woods systern (fixed exchange rates) lasted less than three decades. 
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